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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DOCKET NO. 7 * ^ ? V~Y
WEST VALLEY CITY,
Plaintiff/Appellee
Case No. 920349-CA
vs.
Priority No, 2
DENNIS STREETER,
Defendant/Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

On Appeal from the Third Circuit Court, West Valley Department,
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah;
the Honorable WILLIAM A. THORNE, Presiding

PAUL T. MORRIS (#3738)
City Attorney
J. RICHARD CATTEN (#4291)
Assistant City Attorney
WEST VALLEY CITY
3600 Constitution Boulevard
West Valley City, Utah 84119
Attorneys for Plaintiff/
Appellee
JERRALD D. CONDER
MICHELLE J. IVIE
CONDER & WANGSGARD
4059 South 4000 West
West Valley City, Utah

84120

Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant

v
OCT 91992,
Mary T. Nconan
Clerk ot the ^ , i
Utah Cnurt ni * - **&

LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT

Pursuant

to Rule

24(b) of the Utah Rules

of Appellate

Procedure, the parties to the action in the Third Circuit Court,
West Valley Department, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
captioned,

West

Valley

City,

Plaintiff

Defendant,

Civil No. 901001586MC

r

v.

Dennis

Streeter,

(which, for the purposes of

appeal, has been consolidated with the action captioned,
Valley

City,

Plaintiff,

v. Dennis L. Streeter,

Defendant,

West

Civil No.

901001677MC), were as follows:

West Valley City1

Plaintiff/Appellee

Dennis Streeter

Defendant/Appellant

The case was captioned West Valley City v. Dennis Streeter in the Third Circuit Court. Appellant Streeter has incorrectly
captioned this appeal as State of Utah v. Dennis L Streeter. The State of Utah is not a party to this action, nor is West Valley City
prosecuting a state statute on behalf of the State of Utah. The ordinance at issue in this case is a West Valley City ordinance, and
the proper Plaintiff is West Valley City.
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- Animal

Fighting
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to Dismiss,

JURISDICTION
Appellate jurisdiction over this case is rested in the Utah
Court of Appeals, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
West Valley City accepts Appellant Streeter's presentation of
the issues presented on appeal and the appropriate standard of
review.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
See Addendum B

7 U.S.C. § 2156
Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-103:

10-1-103. Construction.
The powers herein delegated to any municipality shall be
liberally construed to permit the municipality to exercise the
powers granted by this act except in cases clearly contrary to
the intent of the law.
1977
Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-106:
10-1-106. Scope of act.
This act shall apply to all municipalities incorporated
or existing under the law of the State of Utah except as
otherwise specifically excepted by the home rule provisions of
Article XI, Section 5 of the Constitution of the State of
Utah.
1977
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1210:
10-3-1210. Function of the council.
The municipal council of a municipality adopting an
optional form of government provided for in this part shall
pass
ordinances,
appropriate
funds, review
municipal
administration, and perform all duties that may be required of
it by law.
1977
Utah Code Ann. S 10-8-47:
10-8-47.

Intoxication — Fights — Disorderly conduct
—
Assault and battery — Petit larceny — Riots and
disorderly assemblies — Firearms and fireworks —
1

False pretenses and embezzlement — Sale of liquor,
narcotics or tobacco to minors — Possession of
controlled substances — Treatment of alcoholics
and narcotics or drug addicts.
They may prevent intoxication, fighting, quarrelling, dog
fights, cockfights, prize fights, bullfights, and all
disorderly conduct and provide agciinst and punish the offenses
of assault and battery and petit larceny; they may restrain
riots, routs, noises, disturbances or disorderly assemblies in
any street, house or place in the city; they may regulate and
prevent the discharge of firearms, rockets, powder, fireworks
or any other dangerous or combustible material; they may
provide against and prevent the offense of obtaining money or
property under false pretenses and the offense of embezzling
money or property in all cases where the money or property
embezzled or obtained under false pretenses does not exceed in
value the sum of $100 and may prohibit the sale, giving away
or furnishing of intoxicating liquors or narcotics, or of
tobacco to any person under twenty-one years of age; cities
may, by ordinance, prohibit the possession of controlled
substances as defined in the Utah Controlled Substances Act,
provided the conduct is not a class A misdemeanor or felony,
and provide for treatment of alcoholics, narcotic addicts and
other persons who are addicted to the use of drugs or
intoxicants such that they substantially lack the capacity to
control their use of the drugs or intoxicants, and judicial
supervision may be imposed as a means of effecting their
rehabilitation.
1981
Utah Code Ann, & 10-8-59:
10-8-59• Cruelty to animals.
They may prohibit cruelty to animals.

1953

Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-84:
10-8-84.

Ordinances, rules and regulations —
Passage
—
Penalties.
They may pass all ordinances and rules, an [and] make all
regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary for carrying into
effect or discharging all powers and duties conferred by this
chapter, and as are necessary and proper to provide for the
safety and preserve the health, and promote the prosperity,
improve the morals, peace and good order, comfort, and
convenience of the city and its inhabitants, and for the
protection of property in the city; and may enforce obedience
to the ordinances with fines or penalties as they may deem
proper, but the punishment of any offense shall be by fine not
to exceed the maximum class B misdemeanor fine under Section
76-3-301 or by imprisonment not to exceed six months, or by
both the fine and imprisonment.
1986
2

Section 23-5-104(8), West Valley City Municipal Code:
23-5-104. CRUELTY TO ANIMALS PROHIBITED.
(8) Animals for fighting:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person or
corporation to raise, keep or use any animal,
fowl or bird for the purpose of fighting or
baiting; and for any person to be a party to
or be present as a spectator at any such
fighting or baiting of any animal or fowl; and
for any person, firm or corporation to
knowingly rent any building, shed, room, yard,
ground or premises for any such purposes as
aforesaid, or to knowingly suffer or permit
the use of his buildings, sheds, rooms, yards,
grounds
or
premises
for
the
purposes
aforesaid,
(b) Law Enforcement Officers or Office of Animal
Control officials may enter any building or
place where there is an exhibition of the
fighting or baiting of a live animal, or where
preparations are being made for such an
exhibition, and the Law Enforcement Officers
may arrest persons there present and take
possession of all animals engaged in fighting,
or there found for the purposes of fighting,
along with all implements or applications used
in such exhibition. This provision shall not
be interpreted to authorize a search or arrest
without a warrant when such is required by
law.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
West Valley City accepts Appellant Streeter's presentation of
the statement of the case.
RELEVANT FACTS
West Valley City accepts Appellant Streeter's presentation of
the facts, with the following additions:

3

1.
R-2.

Streeter was charged by citation and information (R-l. 1;

1-2 ) 2 with violating

Municipal Code3.

§ 23-5-104 of the West Valley

City

Section 23-5-104(8) provides that, "It shall be

unlawful for any person or corporation to raise, keep or use any
animal, fowl or bird for the purpose of fighting or baiting . . . "
2.

In Case No. 901001586MC, Streeter specifically admitted

conduct establishing the elements of the crime, and entered a
conditional

plea

of guilty

subject

to retaining

challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance.
3.

his

right

to

(R-l. 17-24)

In Case No. 901001677MC, Streeter specifically admitted

conduct establishing the elements of the crime, and entered a
conditional

plea

of guilty

subject to retaining

challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance.

his

right

to

(R-l, 26-34)

2
Case No. 901001586MC and Case No. 901001677MC were consolidated by the Court of Appeals under Case No. 920349CA. Because the trial court's record is numbered individually under each case number, all references to the Record shall be
as follows: R-1 shall pertain to the Record in Case No. 901001586MC, and all references to R-2 shall pertain to Case No.
901001677MC

Throughout Appellant's Brief, Streeter incorrectly refers to the West Valley City Municipal Code as "Revised West Valley
City OrdinancesVRWVCO." Section 1-1-101 of the West Valley City Municipal Code reads as follows:
1-1-101. HOW CODE DESIGNATED AND CITED.
The ordinances embraced in the following chapters and sections shall constitute
and be designated "The West Valley City Municipal Code," and may be so cited. Such
Code may also be cited as the "West Valley City Code" or "Code."

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
IT IS WITHIN THE POWER OF WEST VALLEY CITY TO
ENACT § 23-5-104(8) OF THE WEST VALLEY CITY
MUNICIPAL CODE, WHICH PROHIBITS ANY PERSON
FROM RAISING, KEEPING OR USING ANY FOWL OR
BIRD FOR THE PURPOSE OF FIGHTING.
West Valley City is an incorporated city, established pursuant
to the provisions of Title 10 of the Utah Code.

It derives its

police power with regard to the prevention of cockfighting and its
supporting activities from both specific grants of power and the
general welfare provisions of Title 10.
establishes
construed

that

and

the

City's

Utah case law clearly

police power

that municipalities

should

be

liberally

have wide discretion

exercise of their police power in the public interest.

in the

Courts will

not interfere with the City legislative body's use of police power
as long as its use is reasonably related to providing for the
public safety, health, morals and welfare.

In this case, the

prohibition against raising, keeping or using birds or fowl for the
purpose of fighting is a reasonable use of the City's police power
to further the legislative policy against animal fighting ventures.
Furthermore,

the

extraterritorial

West
criminal

Valley

City

ordinance

is

not

an

statute, but, rather, only regulates

activity within West Valley City.
Appellant Streeter's argument is based on the false premise
that West Valley City is a chartered city, and the cases upon which
he relies are outdated and have been overruled.

5

POINT II
SECTION 23-5-104(8) OF THE WEST VALLEY CITY
MUNICIPAL CODE IS NOT VOID FOR VAGUENESS.
Section 23-5-104(8) of the West Valley City Municipal Code
contains no uncertain or confusing terms, and is not vague on its
face.

Also, the ordinance is not vague in its application to

Streeter.
crime,

He has admitted committing the specific elements of the

Streeter lacks standing to raise questions of vagueness

regarding hypothetical fact situations.
POINT III
SECTION 23-5-104(8) OF THE WEST VALLEY CITY
MUNICIPAL CODE IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD.
Section 23-5-104(8) of the West Valley City Municipal Code is
not over-broad, and does not impinge upon innocent conduct.

The

ordinance contains a clear mental element which requires that game
birds be raised, kept or used "for the purpose of fighting."

This

mental element protects those who may innocently own game birds,
but who have no intent that the birds fight. Also, Streeter has no
standing to raise hypothetical challenges to the ordinance, and the
ordinance is clearly not over-broad as it relates to the facts of
his case.

6

POINT IV
SECTION 23-5-104(8) OF THE WEST VALLEY CITY
MUNICIPAL CODE IS NOT PREEMPTED BY THE ANIMAL
WELFARE ACT AMENDMENT OF 1976, 7 U.S.C.
§ 2156,
NOR
DOES
IT
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
RESTRICT THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL.
The Animal Welfare Act Amendment of 1976, 7 U.S.C. § 2156, has
a specific section expressing Congress' intent to not preempt state
law except in cases of direct and irreconcilable conflict with the
federal statute.

7 U.S.C. § 2156(h).

There is no direct and

irreconcilable conflict between the federal statute and the West
Valley City ordinance.

To the contrary, the West Valley City

ordinance is compatible with the federal statute.

The federal

statute and the ordinance compliment each other and further the
common legislative policy of restricting or prohibiting animal
fighting.
Also, the ordinance does not restrict interstate travel.

It

is a reasonable exercise of police power and is not in conflict
with the Fourteenth Amendment of the United State Constitution.
POINT V
SECTION 23-5-104(8) OF THE WEST VALLEY CITY
MUNICIPAL CODE IS A REASONABLE USE OF THE
CITY'S POLICE POWER FOR THE PUBLIC WELFARE,
AND DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE I, § 1 OF THE
UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Section 23-5-104(8) of the West Valley City Municipal Code is
a reasonable exercise of the City's police power, and furthers the
legislative purpose of preventing cockfighting.

In reasonable

exercises of the City's police power, the City may prohibit or
restrict

an

individual's

right
7

to

possess

or

use

property.

Constitutional provisions, such as Article I, § 1 of the Utah
Constitution, which relate to the rights of individuals to acquire
or possess property, must be construed and applied in light of the
police power of the City as expressed by its legislative body.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
IT IS WITHIN THE POWER OF WEST VALLEY CITY TO
ENACT § 23-5-104(8) OF THE WEST VALLEY CITY
MUNICIPAL CODE, WHICH PROHIBITS ANY PERSON
FROM RAISING, KEEPING OR USING ANY FOWL OR
BIRD FOR THE PURPOSE OF FIGHTING.
It is clearly within the authority of the West Valley City
Council, as legislative body for West Valley City, to enact an
ordinance which makes it unlawful for any person to raise, keep or
use any bird or fowl for the purpose of fighting.

Streeter's

argument that the City has exceeded its authority is premised on
the incorrect notion that West Valley City is a chartered city
subject

to

the

language

of

Article

XI,

§

5

of

the

Utah

Constitution. This premise is plainly incorrect, since West Valley
City

is not a chartered

city.

(See

Addendum A, Articles

of

Incorporation of West Valley City.)
West Valley City is an incorporated city created pursuant to
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-101, et seq.

It derives

its authority from the provisions of Title 10 of the Utah Code,
which apply to all municipalities except those subject to the home
rule (charter cities) provisions of Article XI, § 5 of the Utah
Constitution.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-106. The City has adopted the

council-manager

form of government allowed under the

8

"Optional

Forms of Municipal Government Act," Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1201, et
seq.

This alternative form of government retains all the rights,

powers and duties granted to other municipalities of the same
class.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1205.

In West Valley City's form of

government, it is the City Council which performs the legislative
function and has the responsibility for passing City ordinances.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1210.

The City Council's authority to enact

§ 23-5-104(8) of the West Valley City Municipal Code, making it
unlawful to raise, keep or use birds or fowl for the purpose of
fighting, is based both upon specific grants of power and a general
grant of power contained in Title 10 of the Utah Code.
First,

in

Utah

Code

Ann.

§

10-8-47,

the

Legislature

specifically grants cities the authority to prevent cockfights.
This section provides no restrictions or limits on the manner in
which cockfights are to be prevented.

Clearly, the manner in which

cockfights are prevented is left to the discretion of the city.
The second specific grant of authority is contained in Utah
Code Ann. § 10-8-59, which grants cities the authority to prohibit
cruelty to animals. Again, it is clearly left to the discretion of
the cities how they wish to implement such a prohibition.
Finally, Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-84 provides that a city:
. . may pass all ordinances and rules, an
[and] make all regulations, not repugnant to
law, necessary for carrying into effect or
discharging all powers and duties conferred by
this chapter, and as are necessary and proper
to provide for the safety and preserve the
health, and promote the prosperity, improve
the morals, peace and good order, comfort, and
convenience of the city and its inhabitants,
9

and for the protection of property in the
city . . .
This general grant of authority, often referred to as a "general
welfare" clause, grants West Valley City the authority to enact
such ordinances as it feels are necessary for the good of its
citizens.

This general welfare clause provides the City with a

basis for the use of its police power in the best interests of its
citizens.
Ordinances which are enacted pursuant to a city's police power
are

presumed

Commission,

to

be valid.

Redwood

Gym v.

624 P.2d 1138, 1143 (Utah 1981).

Salt

Lake

County

General welfare

clauses, in particular, should be liberally construed so that a
municipality has wide discretion in the exercise of its police
power.

State

v. Hutchinson,

624 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1980).

Streeter misleads the court on the current state of Utah law
when he states, "The police powers of West Valley City are strictly
limited

to those expressly granted

statute."

by state

(Appellant's Brief, p. 13.)

proposition, he cites Nance v. Mayflower
(Utah 1944) and Salt

Lake City

As authority for that

Tavern,

v. Sutter,

constitution or

Inc.,

150 P. 2d 773

216 P. 234 (Utah 1923).

(Appellant's Brief, p. 13.)

These two cases relied on what was

known as the "Dillon Rule."

The Dillon Rule, which was a very

restrictive view of the powers of cities, was repudiated by the
Utah Supreme Court in the 1980 Hutchinson
The Hutchinson

decision cited above.

court stated that, "The Dillon Rule of strict

construction is antithetical to effective and efficient local and
state government."

Hutchinson,

624 P.2d, at 1126. The court also
10

wrote, "For the reasons stated herein, we expressly abandon the
rule of strict construction of municipal and county powers insofar
as it has heretofore had a basis in Utah law.

Hutchinson,

624

P.2d, at 1119 (footnote 3 ) . The cases that Streeter relies upon in
his argument are virtually all pre-Hutchinson

"Dillon Rule" cases.

In fact, many cases that Streeter cites, i.e., Nance}

Parker
Salt

v. Provo

Lake City,

Robinson,

City

Corp.,

Sutter;

543 P. 2d 796 (Utah 1975); Stevenson

317 P. 2d 597 (Utah 1957); and American

Fork City

292 P. 249 (Utah 1930), are all cited in Hutchinson

v.
v.
as

examples of the use of the now defunct "Dillon Rule."
The Hutchinson

decision provides the current Utah law with

respect to the police power of local governments.
that

general

welfare

grants

of

authority

should

In determining
be

liberally

construed, the court stated:
When the state has granted general welfare
power to local governments, those governments
have independent authority apart from, and in
addition to, specific grants of authority to
pass ordinances which are reasonably and
appropriately related to the objectives of
that power, i.e., providing for the public
safety, health, morals and welfare, [citation
omitted]
And the courts will not interfere
with the legislative choice of the means
selected unless it is arbitrary, or is
directly prohibited by, or is inconsistent
with the policy of, the state or federal laws
or the constitution of this state or of the
United States.
Hutchinson,

624 P.2d, at 1126.

With regard to specific grants of

authority, the court stated that, "Specific grants should generally
be

construed

with

reasonable

latitude

in

light

of

the

broad

language of the general welfare clause which may supplement the
11

power found in a specific delegation."

Hutchinson,

624 P.2d, at

1126.
As stated in the above quotation from the Hutchinson

case,

courts will not interfere with the legislative body's use of police
power unless it is arbitrary or prohibited by or inconsistent with
law or the State or Federal Constitution.

Whether or not it is

inconsistent with federal law or the Utah Constitution is discussed
elsewhere in this Brief.

Streeter has advanced no argument or

authority which indicates that it is prohibited by or inconsistent
with State statutes. Therefore, the question is whether or not the
statute enacted by the West Valley City Council, § 23-5-104(8), is
arbitrary.
The
Hutchinson

section

at

issue

is

clearly

not

and,

as

requires, it is reasonably related to providing for the

public safety, health, morals and welfare.
at 1126.

arbitrary,

Hutchinson,

624 P.2d,

The ordinance specifically relates to and furthers the

goal of the City to prevent cockfights.

Since the City has a

specific grant of power to prevent cockfights (Utah Code Ann. § 1 0 8-47), it naturally follows that it is within the City's power to
prohibit

activities

cockfighting.

which

support

cockfighting

or

facilitate

This is a logical and reasonable way for the City to

further its legislative purpose of preventing cockfighting.
certainly not an unusual use of police power.

It is

For example, while

in pursuit of the legislative purpose of prohibiting the use of
illegal drugs, it is also clearly within the government's power to
prohibit

activities

which

support
12

or

facilitate

drug

use.

Therefore, statutes have been enacted which prohibit the possession
of drugs or the possession of drug paraphernalia, regardless of
actual use.
Suppression of closely related activities and the necessary
instruments of cockfighting clearly bears a reasonable relationship
to preventing the undesired conduct. The Supreme Court of Illinois
addressed this question in the case of Illinois
Association

v.

Block,

Gamefowl

389 N.E.2d 529 (111. 1979).

Breeders

In that case,

the court stated that:
We believe the prohibitions contained in
subsections
(a) and
(c), e.g.,
owning,
breeding, training, selling or transporting,
are
reasonably
related
to
the
proper
governmental purpose of eliminating the evils
associated with animal fighting. Clearly, the
legislature intended to strengthen the ban on
animal fighting by making it illegal to
knowingly engage in the supporting activities
which make animal fighting possible, and the
prohibitions contained in subsections (a) and
(c) were intended to insure that those who
wish to stage such exhibitions will not be
able to procure the needed animals from local
breeders.

Illinois
Section

Gamefowl

Breeders

Association,

389

N.E.2d,

at 533.

23-5-104(8) of the West Valley City Municipal Code is

similarly related to the valid legislative purpose of prohibiting
cockfighting and the evils associated therewith.
Streeter's argument hinges entirely on the idea that West
Valley City citizens can only be harmed by cockfighting if they
witness it; therefore, the only reasonable regulations are those
prohibiting the actual fighting.
footnote 4.)

(Appellant's Brief, p. 15; also

This argument has no merit whatsoever.
13

If taken to

its

logical

conclusion,

the

absurd

result

would

be

a

local

government's police power being restricted to controlling public
events.
place

The City could not criminalize cockfighting which took

privately

and which was

not

"witnessed"

by the public.

Presumably, this would also apply to other non-publicly witnessed
conduct, such as private, illegal drug use.
Streeter makes the additional argument that the West Valley
City ordinance is unconstitutional as being an extraterritorial
criminal statute, since cockfighting is legal in a few states.
is obvious
boundaries.

that West Valley
However,

City cannot

Streeter's

legislate

argument

is

beyond

based

on

It
its
the

supposition that it is legal to possess property in West Valley
City which may be illegal to use in West Valley City, so long as
there is some place where it may be lawfully used.
surprising

that

Streeter

cites

no

authority

to

It is not

support

this

proposition, since the adoption of this argument would render many
laws and ordinances unconstitutional, not just § 23-5-104(8).

For

example, Utah law prohibits the possession of marijuana (Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8), but some states allow the possession of a small
amount of marijuana.

Just because the possession of a limited

amount of marijuana may be legal elsewhere, Utah is not barred from
prohibiting its possession within Utah boundaries. Another example
are the provisions of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, which
prohibit the possession of beer by the general public in containers
larger than two liters. Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-206.

This statute

effectively eliminated the general public's use of beer in kegs
14

within

Utah.

including

Utah's

Streeter's
drinking

Obviously,

surrounding

rationale,

of

beer

most

Utah

from

states

in

the

United

states, allow beer
would

kegs, but

kegs.

States,
Under

be

allowed

to

prohibit

the

not

allowed

to prohibit

the

possession of a keg if the keg is to be used in a state where kegs
are legal.
The unsound basis of this argument is apparent.

In reality,

Streeter is urging the extraterritorial application of Arizona law
to West Valley City.

The fact that cockfighting may be legal in

Arizona has absolutely no effect outside the boundaries of Arizona,
and does not impair West Valley City's ability to prescribe certain
conduct within the boundaries of West Valley City.
It is clear that the enactment of § 23-5-104(8) by West Valley
City is a valid exercise of the police power granted to the City by
Title 10 of the Utah Code.

Streeter's argument is based on an

incorrect premise and outdated case law, and should be disregarded.
POINT II
SECTION 23-5-104(8) OF THE WEST VALLEY CITY
MUNICIPAL CODE IS NOT VOID FOR VAGUENESS.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that
a statute or ordinance define an "offense with
sufficient definiteness that ordinary people
can understand what conduct is prohibited and
in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement."
Greenwood

v.

City

quoting Kolender

of

North

Salt

v. Lawson,

1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983).

Lake,

817 P. 2d 816 (Utah 1991),

461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S. Ct. 1855,
In a vagueness challenge that does

not involve constitutionally protected conduct, the court should
15

uphold the challenge only if the enactment is impermissibly vague
in

all

of

Flipslde,

its

Village

applications.

Hoffman

Estates,

L.Ed.2d 362, 369 (1982).

of

Hoffman

Estates

455 U.S. 480, 102 S. Ct.

v.

1186, 71

The "constitutionally protected conduct"

referred to is limited to First Amendment conduct, which is not at
issue here.

State

(Utah App. 1991).

v.

Archambeau,

820 P. 2d 920, 928-footnote 16

Also, legislative enactments are reviewed with

the presumption that they are constitutional.
P. 2d,

at

927.

Section

23-5-104(8)

of

the

Archambeau,
West

820

Valley

City

Municipal Code clearly delineates the conduct which it prohibits
and is not vague or confusing on its face or in its application to
Streeter.
An ordinance may be challenged both on its face and in its
application.

In this case, a facial attack upon the ordinance is

obviously not successful.
confusing terms.

The ordinance contains no uncertain or

The clear legislative purpose is to prohibit

people from raising, keeping or using animals for the specific
purpose of fighting.

It is doubtful that the purpose could be

written any clearer than the language of this ordinance which
states, "It shall be unlawful for any person or corporation to
raise, keep or use any animal, fowl or bird for the purpose of
fighting or baiting . . . "

Section 23-5-104(8) of the West Valley

City Municipal Code.
An ordinance may also be challenged
application.

for vagueness

in its

In this type of challenge, the ordinance must be

examined in light of the facts of the case.
16

United

States

v.

Mazurie,

419 U.S. 544, 550, 42 L.Ed.2d 706, 713, 95 S. Ct. 710

(1975).

In this case, Streeter argues that the ordinance lacks a

scienter

or

intent requirement, which

renders

its

application

vague.

This is simply not an accurate representation

elements

of § 23-5-104(8).

of

the

The ordinance has a clear mental

element requiring that the birds be raised, kept or used for the
specific purpose of fighting or baiting. As was described by Judge
Thorne in his Decision on the Motion to Dismiss:
In
a
criminal
prosecution
under
this
ordinance, the City must present sufficient
proof to establish beyond a reasonable doubt
the mental intent element of " . . . for the
purpose of fighting or baiting
. . . ."
Requiring proof of a mental intent is not an
unusual or suspect requirement, but in fact
provides
the
necessary
protections
for
11
innocent" ownership.
(R-l. 45; emphasis in original.)
Streeter also argues that "a person who unknowingly possesses
fowl or birds which could be used for "fighting or baiting," or
which may be sold in a state where such "fighting or baiting" is
legal, would be punished

. . ."

(Appellant's Brief, p.

23.)

Besides being incorrect in light of the City's responsibility to
prove the mental intent element of this ordinance, Streeter has no
standing to bring such a challenge.
Mazurie

As was set forth in the

case cited above, Streeter's vagueness challenge must be

examined in light of the facts of his case. The Utah Supreme Court
has

stated,

"A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is

clearly prescribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as
applied to the conduct of others."
17

Greenwood,

817 P.2d, at 820,

quoting Village
Inc.,

of Hoffman

Estates

v. Flipside,

Hoffman

Estates,

445 U.S. 480, 494-95, 102 S. Ct. 1186, 1191, 71 L.Ed.2d 362,

369 (1982).

See

also,

Parker

v. Levy,

417 U.S. 733, 94 S. Ct.

2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439, 458 (1974), where the court stated, "One to
whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully
challenge it for vagueness."

Streeter has made no allegation that

he "unknowingly" possessed birds which could be used for fighting.
To the contrary, he readily admits all of the elements of the
crime. He admits that he raised and kept birds in West Valley City
for the purpose of fighting them in the State of Arizona•

Under

the facts of this case, the statute is not void in its application
to Streeter, and he has admitted each and every element of the
crime.
Section 23-5-104(8) of the West Valley City Municipal Code is
neither vague on its face nor in its application to the Defendant,
Streeter.
POINT III
SECTION 23-5-104(8) OF THE WEST VALLEY CITY
MUNICIPAL CODE IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD.
Section 23-5-104(8) is clearly not over-broad, since it does
not prohibit constitutionally protected activity while prohibiting
unprotected behavior. State

v. Frampton,

737 P.2d 183 (Utah 1987).

The ordinance applies to those limited circumstances defined by its
elements and does not sweep innocent conduct into a criminal act.
Streeter attempts to argue overbreadth by providing the court
with facts other than his own.

For instance, he states:
18

The problem with this sweeping language is
that it prohibits conduct, such as the simple
possession of the game birds in West Valley
City, which may be utilized for legal and
legitimate
activities
in
foreign
jurisdictions.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 25.)

He also makes the claim that the

ordinance is subject to subjective enforcement by the Animal
Control Director.

(Appellant's Brief, p. 26.)

Streeter clearly

has no standing to bring these arguments to the court.

These

arguments present the court with hypothetical situations that are
not concerned with the facts relating to Streeter.

Streeter does

not contend that he simply owned game birds. Streeter's facts are
that he has admitted to raising and keeping birds for the purpose
of fighting. The ordinance is clearly not over-broad as it relates
to those facts. A person to whom a statute may be constitutionally
applied cannot challenge the statute on the ground that it may
conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations
not before the court. Broadrick

v. Oklahoma,

413 U.S. 601, 610, 93

S. Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830, 839 (1973).
Furthermore, Streeter's argument is not well-founded.

The

clear mental element of § 23-5-104(8), which requires the City to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the birds are kept or raised
"for the purpose of fighting or baiting," obviously protects those
who may innocently own game fowl without such intent.

Similarly,

the power of the Animal Control Director to impound birds is
contingent upon proof of a violation of the ordinance, which would
necessarily include the mental element, thereby protecting innocent
parties.
19

Finally, Streeter again argues that § 23-5-104(8) is an
extraterritorial criminal statute. This is simply not accurate, as
was discussed under Point I on pages 13 and 14.
Section 23-5-104(8) does not punish or prohibit the conduct of
parties which falls outside of the specific prohibitions of the
ordinance as set forth by its elements.

Streeter has not shown

that the element is over-broad on its face or in its application to
him.
POINT IV
SECTION 23-5-104(8) OF THE WEST VALLEY CITY
MUNICIPAL CODE IS NOT PREEMPTED BY THE ANIMAL
WELFARE ACT AMENDMENT OF 1976, 7 U.S.C.
§ 2156, NOR
DOES
IT
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
RESTRICT THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL.
As Judge Thorne found in his well reasoned Decision, the
Animal Welfare Act Amendment of 1976, 7 U.S.C. § 2156 (Addendum B ) ,
which prohibits activity relating to the moving of fighting animals
in interstate commerce, does not preempt § 23-5-104(8) of the West
Valley City Municipal Code, Judge Thorne noted that preemption is
not to be lightly presumed [California

Association

v.

Guerraf

Federal

Savings

and

Loan

479 U.S. 272, 107 S. Ct. 683, 93 L.Ed.2d

613, 623 (1987)]; and, after a careful analysis of the federal
statute, determined that it does not directly conflict with the
West Valley City ordinance.

(R-l. 38-42; Addendum C)

The United States Supreme Court has stated that, "The question
of whether a certain state action is preempted by federal law is
one of congressional intent . . . to discern Congress' intent we
examined the explicit statutory language and the structure and
20

purpose of the statute,"

Ingersoll-Rand

v. McClendon,

_ , 111 S. Ct. 478, 112 L.Ed.2d 474, 483 (1990).

498 U.S.

In this case,

the federal statutory language clearly expresses Congress' intent
on the extent to which the Animal Welfare Act Amendment of 1976
preempts state law.

Title 7, U.S.C., § 2156(h), states:

The provisions of this chapter shall not
supersede or otherwise invalidate any such
state, local, or municipal legislation or
ordinance relating to animal fighting ventures
except
in
case
of
the
direct
and
irreconcilable
conflict
between
any
requirements thereunder and this chapter or
any rule, regulation or standard hereunder.
By

enacting

this

section,

Congress

reserved

the

individual

municipality's right to regulate animal fighting, except in the
case of a direct and irreconcilable conflict between the state and
federal statutes.

This is an indication of Congress' intent to

interfere as little as possible with municipal regulation of animal
fighting.

In this case, Streeter has demonstrated no direct or

irreconcilable conflict between the West Valley City ordinance and
the federal statute.
Streeter's entire argument is based upon the notion that since
Congress chose not to criminalize interstate movement of fighting
game birds which are being transported to a state which allows
cockfighting, Congress has thereby established a preempting right
to transport birds to such states.

As Judge Thome correctly

found:
Congressional decisions not to criminalize
certain conduct does not mean that all such
conduct is federally protected. Failure of
Congress to include a "shoplifting" statute
within the scheme of federal offenses does not
21

mean that Congress has decided to protect such
activity.
(R-l. 41)

There is no evidence whatsoever that Congress, by this

omission in the federal criminal statute, intended to create a
right to transport birds that Streeter can now rely on to preempt
municipal ordinances.
Furthermore, the West Valley City ordinance is compatible with
the federal statute. The legislative policy reflected by both laws
is an attempt to curtail the use of animals for fighting purposes.
The federal law makes it a criminal act for any person to:
. • . knowingly
sell, buy;, transport
or
deliver to another person or receive from
another person for purposes of transportation,
in interstate or foreign commerce, any dog or
other animal for purposes of having the dog or
other animal participate in an animal fighting
venture.
7

U.S.C.

§

2156(b)

(emphasis

added).

The

West

Valley

City

ordinance prohibits the related but distinct conduct of a person
who chooses to "raise, keep or use any animal, fowl or bird for the
purpose of fighting or baiting."
Valley

City Municipal

Code

Section 23-5-104(8) of the West

(emphasis

added).

These

two

laws

complement each other and further the common legislative policy of
restricting or prohibiting animal fighting.
There is no direct or irreconcilable conflict between § 23-5104(8) of the West Valley City Municipal Code and 7 U.S.C. § 2156,
the Animal Welfare Act Amendment of 1976. The acts are compatible,
and the West Valley City ordinance is not preempted by the federal
statute.

22

Streeter

also

argues

that

§

23-5-104(8)

impermissibly

infringes upon the right to travel, and therefore violates the
Fourteenth

Amendment

of

the

United

States

Constitution.

authority for this notion, Streeter cites Shapiro
U.S. 618, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d
however,

the

court

rested

its

v. Thompson,

600 (1969).

decision

upon

In

As
394

Shapiro,

unjustified

classifications of people with respect to a waiting period for
welfare benefits.

Even assuming that Shapiro

applies to a police

power case such as this (and the City contends that it does not),
Streeter has not shown that the ordinance creates impermissible
classifications or that he is a member of a protected class.
If Streeter's argument were taken to its logical conclusion,
virtually all criminal statutes would have to be identical among
the fifty states. Differences among the states would "restrict" an
individual's right to travel.

This argument has no merit.

As the

Supreme Court stated in a decision of Fourteenth Amendment liberty
interests:
. . . the Constitution does not recognize an
absolute and uncontrollable liberty. Liberty
in each of its phases has its history and
connotation. But the liberty safeguarded is
liberty
in a social organization
which
requires the protection of law against the
evils which menace the health, safety, morals
and welfare of the people. Liberty under the
Constitution is thus necessarily subject to
the restraints of due process, and regulation
which is reasonable in relation to its subject
and is adopted in the interests of the
community is due process.

23

West

Coast

Hotel

Co. v.

81 L.Ed. 703 (1936).

Parrlsh,

300 U.S. 379, 391, 57 S. Ct. 578,

§ 23-5-104(8) is a reasonable exercise of

police power that does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
POINT V
SECTION 23-5-104(8) OF THE WEST VALLEY CITY
MUNICIPAL CODE IS A REASONABLE USE OF THE
CITY'S POLICE POWER FOR THE PUBLIC WELFARE,
AND DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE I, § 1 OF THE
UTAH CONSTITUTION.
The parties agree that where an important public interest
requires the safeguarding of health, morals, safety or welfare,
even the most basic property rights meiy be limited.
Brief, p. 36.)

(Appellant's

Section 23-5-104(8) is a reasonable use of police

power in the public interest and does not violate Streeter's
constitutional property rights.
Constitutional provisions regarding the rights of acquiring,
possessing and protecting property, in whatever terms expressed,
must nevertheless be construed and applied in connection with the
police power of the state. State

v. Briggs,

146 P. 261, 262 (Utah

1915) •
As was discussed extensively under Point I, West Valley City
has both specific authority (Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-47; § 10-8-59)
and authority under the general welfare provision of Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-8-84 to exercise its police power by preventing cockfighting
and enacting ordinances for the general welfare of City citizens.
In this case, Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-47 specifically granted the
City the authority to prevent cockfights. As discussed under Point
I, it is well within the City's police power to prohibit conduct
24

associated with, supporting or which may encourage or facilitate
cockf ighting.
important.
but,

The specific language of Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-47 is

It does not say that the City may punish cockf ighting;

rather,

that

the

City

may

prevent

it.

That

the

City

legislative body may determine it is in the public interest of the
citizens of West Valley City to prevent cockfighting by prohibiting
those activities which support or may contribute to cockfighting,
is without question.

Also, as was discussed extensively under

Point I, the general welfare provision of Title 10 (Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-8-84) clearly provides an additional basis for use of the
City's police power in this case.
Section 23-5-104(8) is a reasonable exercise of police power,
which was enacted in the same spirit and upon the same rationale as
the

numerous

possession

of

other

statutes

and

certain property.

ordinances

which

prohibit

In fact, West Valley

ordinance is less intrusive than many.

City's

Unlike ordinances which

prohibit the possession of drug paraphernalia, drugs, alcohol or
other banned property, the West Valley City ordinance does not
restrict simple possession; but, rather, only restricts the keeping
or raising of fowl "for the purpose of fighting or baiting."
This limited intrusion upon individual property rights for the
benefit and welfare of the public is a reasonable exercise of
police

power

by a municipal

legislative

conflict with the Utah Constitution.

25

body, and

is not

in

CONCLUSION
For the reasons advanced above, the trial court's denial of
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and denicil of Defendant's Motion to
Reconsider Motion to Dismiss should be affirmed in all respects,
and § 23-5-104(8) of the West Valley City Municipal Code should be
found constitutionally sound,
DATED this 9th day of October , 1992.

J A feichard Catten
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
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Addendum A
Articles of Incorporation ol West Valley City

West Valley City
3600 Constitution Boulevaid
West Valley City, Utah 84119
CERTIFICATION
I

Karen S. Leftwich

City Recorder

West Valley City, do hereby certify the attached
Incorporation

dated

Articles of
__

May 14

f

19 80

, to In a t i ue and correct copy

ot said document as recorded and as on file in the West Valley city
Recordf r ' i < I f i ro.
DATED this

6th

day of

October

, 1992

.

3469608

OFFICE OF THE LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR/SECRETARY OF STATE

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, DAVID S. MONSON, LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR/SECRETARY OF STATE OF
THE STATE OF UTAH, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT there has been filed in my office
a certified copy of the Articles of Incorporation of WEST VALLEY CITY, dated
May 14, 1980, complying with Section 10-2-108, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended 1977.
NOW, THEREFORE, in compliance with the requirements of Section
10-21-108, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended 1977, notice is hereby given
to all whom it may concern that the attached is a true and correct copy of
the Articles of Incorporation referred to above on file with the Secretary
of State pertaining to WEST VALLEY CITY, a city of the second class, located
in Salt Lake County, Utah.

The date of incorporation is indicated to be

July 1, 1980.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto
set my hand and affixed the Great
Seal of the State of Utah at Salt
Lake City, this 26th day of August,
1980.

DAVID S. MONSON
Lt. Governor

"^

,/ c

as6.~.£t

— rc<
Authorized Person

CO

CO

en

ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION
OF
WEST VALLEY CITY
(a M u n i c i p a l

The u n d e r s i g n e d ,
qualified

Corporation)

Henry P r i c e ,

being duly elecoed

and

Mayor o f West V a l l e y C i t y d o e s h e r e b y c e r t i f y

the

fol-

lowing:
ARTICLE I
NAME
The name o f

the C i t y

i s WEST VALLEY CITY.
ARTICLE I I
DESCRIPTION

The g e o g r a p h i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n o f WEST VALLEY CITY

is:

Beginning a t the S. W. Comer Section 3, T. 2. S . , R. 2 W , , S. L. B. and M.,
and running thence North along the West l i n e o f s*id Section 3 and the West
l i n e s of Section 34, 27 and 22, T. 1 S . , R. 2 W., S. L. B. and M., t o the N. W.
Corner of s a i d Section 22; thence East along the North l i n e of Sections 22, 23
and 24, T. I S . , R. 2 W., S. L. B. and M., t o the S a l t Lake City Boundary l i n e
which i s located on the N. E. Corner of s a i d Section 24; thence South
50.0 f e e t along Lhe Boundary of S a l t Lake City; theiice East along the Boundary
l i n e o f S a l t Lake City which l i n e i s 50 f e e t South of the North l i n e of S e c t i o n s
19, 20 and 21, T. I S . , R. 1 W., S. L. B. and M., to a point located 783.0 f e e t
East o f the West l i n e of said Section 21; thence South 69.35 f e e t , more or l e s s ,
along said boundary of S a l t Lake City to a point 783.0 f e e t East and 119.35 f e e t
South from the N. W. Corner of said Section 21; thence continuing East along
the boundary of S a l t Lake City to a point 117.83 f e e t South and 224.35 f e e t
West of the North h ODrner of Section 22, T. 1 S . , R. 1 W., S. L. B. and M.;
thence S 2° 13* E 90.39 f e e t along the S a l t Lake City boundary; thence N 89° 41' I
277.70 f e e t along the boundary of S a l t Lake City; thence S 0° 04* 26w W along the
East l i n e of Redwood road and the present boundary of S a l t Lake City 142.69 f e e t
to the North Right of Way l i n e of S t a t e Highway No. 201 (21st South Freeway);
thence along s a i d North l i n e and boundary o f S a l t Lake City as f o l l o w s , N 88° 4 1 '

82.00 feet to a point of a 2914.79 foot radius curve to the right; thence Easter 1
along the arc of said curve 487.53 feet to a point of tangency; thence S 81° 44f
431.2? feet to a point of a 5729.58 foot radius curve to the l e f t ; thence Easterl
along the arc of said curve 481.67 feet to a point of tangency; thence S 86° 89*
E 497.56 feetithence N 88° 46' 11" E 700 feet; thence N 87° 13* 41" E 1130 feet, •
or l e w , t o the centerline of the
Jordan River; thenoe leaving said North Right of Way Southerly along the center!
of the Jordan River to the intersection of the Jordan River with the centerline
of the Meadow Brook Expressway, which line i s 1650 feet, more or l e s s , North and
1650 feet, more or l e s s , East of the S. W. Cbrner of Section 35, T. 1 S., R. 1 W,
S. L. B. and M.j thence in a South Westerly direction along the centerline of th<
Meadow Brock Expressway to the midpoint of the South l i n e of Section 34, T. 1 S. (
R. 1 W., S. L. B. and M., which midpoint i s the South h Oomer of said Section 3*
thrmce West along the South Line of Sections 34 and 33, T. I S . , R. 1 W., S. L. I
and M., to the intersection of the midpoint of 2700 West Street, which intersects
point i s the South h Corner of said Section 33; thenoe South along the midpoint c
2700 South Street 5280 feet, more or l e s s , to the South h Corner of Section 4,
T. 2 S., R. 1 W., S. L. B. and M.; thence West along the South lines of Sections
4, 5 and 6, T. 2 S., R. 1 W., S. L. B. and M., and the South l i n e s of Sections 1,
2 and 3, T. 2 S., R. 2 W., S. L. B. and M., to the Southwest Corner of said Sectl
3 and ooint of beginning.
ARTICLE I I I
CLASSIFICATION
According to p o p u l a t i o n , WEST VALLEY CITY i s - a c i t y of the s e cond c l a s s .
ARTICLE IV
DATE OF INCORPORATION
WEST VALLEY CITY s h a l l become i n c o r p o r a t e d a s a municipal c o r p o r a t i o n a t 9:00 o ' c l o c k a.m. JuLyl , 1980.
DATED t h i s

/ 4 ^ d a y of f|AY,, 1980.

ATTEST

GERRY ASHMAN
HENRY PRICE, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he now and at all times mentioned in the foregoing Articles of Incorporation was the Mayor of WEST VALLEY CITY, that he
has read the Articles, that the statements made therein are true
to the best of his knowledge and belief and that the signature
contained therein is the signature of said Mayor of WEST VALLEY
CITY.

ATTEST:

CR

GERRY ASHMAN

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
0n

the

/*/&&

da

Y

of

May, 1980, personally appeared before me

HENRY PRICE, the signer of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

NOTARY PUBLIC, gliding in
Salt Lake County, Utah
My Commission Expires:

2//Y//3

Addendum B
7 U.S.C. § 2156 Animal Fighting Venture Prohibition

§ 2156.

Animal fighting venture prohibition

(a) Sponsoring or exhibiting animal in any fighting venture

It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly sponsor or
exhibit an animal in any animal fighting venture to which any
animal was moved in interstate or foreign commerce.
(b) Buying, selling, delivering, or transporting animals for participation in
animal fighting venture

It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly sell, buy,
transport, or deliver to another person or receive from another
person for purposes of transportation, in interstate or foreign commerce, any dog or other animal for purposes of having the dog or
other animal participate in an animal fighting venture.
(c) Use of Postal Service or other interstate instrumentality for promoting
or furthering animal fighting venture

It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly use the mail
service of the United States Postal Service or any interstate instrumentality for purposes of promoting or in any other manner fur753
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thering an animal fighting venture except as performed outside the
limits of the States of the United States.
(d) Violation of State law

Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of
this section, the activities prohibited by such subsections shall be
unlawful with respect to fighting ventures involving live birds only
if the fight is to take place in a State where it would be in violation
of the laws thereof.
(e) Penalties

Any person who violates subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section
shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned for not more
than 1 year, or both, for each such violation.
rt^ |r,, _»:^~*;,^ ^t , . ; n j M ? r > n s ^y <^ rro t orv . ^^Ktance bv other federal
agencies; issuance of search warrant; forfeiture; costs recoveraoie
in forfeiture or civil action

The Secretary or any other person authorized by him shall make
such investigations as the Secretary deems necessary to determine
whether any person has violated or is violating any provision of this
section, and the Secretary may obtain the assistance of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Department of the Treasury," or other
law enforcement agencies of the United States, and State and local
governmental agencies, in the conduct of such investigations, under
cooperative agreements with such agencies. A warrant to search
for and seize any animal which there is probable cause to believe
was involved in any violation of this section may be issued by any
judge of the United States or of a State court of record or by a
United States magistrate within the district wherein the animal
sought is located. Any United States marshal or any person authorized under this section to conduct investigations may apply for and
execute any such warrant, and any animal seized under such a
warrant shall be held by the United States marshal or other authorized person pending disposition thereof by the court in accordance
with this subsection. Necessary care including veterinary treatment shall be provided while the animals are so held in custody.
Any animal involved in any violation of this section shall be liable
to be proceeded against and forfeited to the United States at any
time on complaint filed in any United States district court or other
court of the United States for any jurisdiction in which the animal
is found and upon a judgment of forfeiture shall be disposed of by
sale for lawful purposes or by other humane means, as the court
may direct. Costs incurred by the United States for care of animals
seized and forfeited under this section shall be recoverable from the
owner of the animals if he appears in such forfeiture proceeding or
754
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in a separate civil action brought in the jurisdiction in which the
owner is found, resides, or transacts business.
(g) Definitions
For purposes of this section—
(1) the term "animal fighting venture" means any event
which involves a fight between at least two animals and is
conducted for purposes of sport, wagering, or entertainment
except that the term "animal fighting venture" shall not be
deemed to include any activity the primary purpose of which
involves the use of one or more animals in hunting another
animal or animals, such as waterfowl, bird, raccoon, or fox
hunting;
(2) the term "interstate or foreign commerce" means—
(A) any movement between any place in a State to any
place in another State or between places in the same State
through another State; or
(B) an> movement iiom a loieign counirj into any 5tate,
(3) the term "interstate instrumentality" means telegraph,
telephone, radio, or television operating in interstate or foreign
commerce;
(4) the term "State" means any State of the United States, the
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and
any territory or possession of the United States;
(5) the term "animal" means any live bird, or any live dog or
other mammal, except man; and
(6) the conduct by any person of any activity prohibited by
this section shall not render such person subject to the other
sections of this chapter as a dealer, exhibitor, or otherwise.
(h) Conflict with State law

The provisions of this chapter shall not supersede or otherwise
invalidate any such State, local, or municipal legislation or ordinance relating to animal fighting ventures except in case of a direct
and irreconcilable conflict between any requirements thereunder
and this chapter or any rule, regulation, or standard hereunder.
(Pub.L. 89-544, § 26(a)-(h)(l), as added Pub.L. 94-279, § 17, Apr. 22, 1976,
90 Stat. 421.)
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports
1976 Act. House Report No. 94-801,
House Conference Report No. 94-976,
see 1976 U.S.Code Cong, and Adm.News,
p. 758.
7U.S.C.A.§§1551 to 2320—26

Codifications
Section consists of subsecs. (a) to
(h)(1) to section 26 of Pub.L. 89-544, as
added by Pub.L. 94-279. Subsec. (h)(2)
of section 26 of Pub.L. 89-544, as added
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Addendum C
Trial Court Decision on Motion to Dismiss,
Dated January 27, 1992

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WEST VALLEY CITY,

*
*
*

Plaintiff,

DECISION ON MOTION
TO DISMISS

*

vs.

*
*
*

DENNIS STREETER,

Case No. 901001586

*

Defendant.

*
*

m i s matter arose as a result of a DUI stop on May 27, 1990.
On May 30, 1990, Dennis Streeter was charged with six counts of
Cruelty to Animals in violation of 23-5-104 of the Revised West
Valley City Ordinances.1

Defendant and counsel, Kirk Bennett,

appeared and entered pleas of not guilty to all charges.

A civil

petition was then filed against Mr. Streeter by West Valley City.
The petition sought the disposition of the animals that were the
subject of the cruelty charges. The DUI and other criminal
matters were resolved and defendant was sentenced on those
matters on January 7, 1991.
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the animal cruelty
charges on several grounds. These included 1) Federal

l

. The defendant was charged with raising, keeping or using
poultry for the purpose of fighting or baiting. As background for
consideration of the arguments made by defendant the court assumes
that the Defendant was returning from having fought the birds in
Arizona, where such fighting is legal. (These facts having been
established at hearings on the other criminal charges for which
defendant has already been sentenced.)

Preemption, 2) an Unconstitutional deprivation of property, and
3) violations of Constitutional Due Process, alleging both
vagueness and overbreadth*

Defendant, through his attorney Kirk

Bennett, and Plaintiff West Valley City, through Keith Stoney the
city prosecutor, filed memorandum supporting and opposing the
requested dismissal.

The civil petition awaits the resolution of

the criminal cruelty charges.
PREEMPTION
Defendant argues that the applicable West Valley City
Ordinance2 has been preempted by Congressional legislation.

In

1976, Congress enacted the Animal Welfare Act Amendment of 1976,
7 U.S.C. 2156, which prohibited activities related to the moving
of fighting animals in interstate commerce.3

Violations were to

carry penalties up to $5,000 and one year in jail.4

Within the

criminal proscription a specific exception was made for live

2

. Section 23-5-108 (8) (a) of the Revised Ordinances of West
Valley City. "It shall be unlawful for any person or corporation
to raise, keep or use any animal, fowl or bird for the purposes of
fighting or baiting;..."
3

. Title 7 U.S.C. Section 2156, Animal fighting venture
prohibition.
(a) "It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly sponsor
or exhibit an animal in any animal fighting venture to which any
animal was moved in interstate or foreign commerce,"
(b) "It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly sell,
buy, transport, or deliver to another person or receive from
another person for purposes of transportation, in interstate or
foreign commerce, any dog or other animal for purposes of having
the dog or other animal participate in an animal fighting venture."
4

. Title 7 U.S.C. Section 2156 (e) .

2

birds, if the fight was to take place in a state that did not
prohibit such fights-5
Defendant cites sections of the Congressional

Record

to

demonstrate that the intent of Congress was to allow cock
fighting because of its historical and traditional roots*

As

Plaintiff West Valley City has pointed out, and my research
confirmedf the citations to these quotes are inaccurate or
misleading and raise a number of questions.6
California Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra,
93 L. Ed. 2d 613 (1987) , sets forth the task of a court when
deciding issues of preemption.

"In determining whether a state

statute is pre-preempt by federal law and therefore invalid under
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution (the) sole task is to
ascertain the intent of Congress."7 The United States Supreme
Court has set out in Guerra three methods whereby Congressional
intent may be determined when deciding whether federal action
will supersede state enactments.

First, Congress may expressly

state that it is preempting state law.

Second, Congressional

5

. Title 7 U.S.C. Section 2156 (d) . "Notwithstanding the
provisions of subsections (a) , (b) , or (c) of the section, the
activities prohibited by such subsections shall be unlawful with
respect to fighting ventures involving live birds only if the fight
is to take place in a State where it would be in violation of the
laws thereof."
6

. Even after the inaccuracy of the citations was pointed out
by Plaintiff in its memorandum, Defendant has not supplied the
Court with proper citations.
This has caused additional
difficulties because of the lack of resource materials readily
available to the Court in the West Valley location.
7

. 93 L. Ed. 2d 613, 623 (1987).
3

intent to preempt may be inferred where the scheme of federal
regulation is so extensive or comprehensive as to leave no room
for supplementary state action.

Third, where Congress has not

completely displaced state regulation, federal law will still
preempt state action if either a) it is physically impossible to
comply with both federal and state requirements or b) where state
law becomes an obstacle to the achievement of Congressional
objectives*8
Rather than arguing application of one of these methods of
determining "preemptive intent/1 Defendant simply argues that
Congress " . • .implicitly determined that the states were not to
interfere with the breeding and training of gamecocks for
transportation into jurisdictions where cockfighting was
lawful."9

Plaintiff argues that an analysis of the "Interstate

and Foreign commerce" language demonstrates that Congress
resolved not to meddle in the affairs of States.10 Neither of
these arguments is convincing.11

K Ibid.
9

. Defendant's Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Dismiss, p.

4.
10

. Plaintiff's Memorandum In Opposition, p. 14.

11

. Particularly, when the argument cites Interstate and
Foreign Commerce language as evidencing Congressional intent not to
interfere with States.
Rather, such federal intrusion into
otherwise state matters rests almost solely on just such commerce
grounds.
4

PREEMPTION ANALYSIS
The Congressional action that Defendant relies upon is a
criminal statute that sets forth penalties for specific conduct.
Congress determined that activities related to the interstate
transportation of most fighting animals should be federal crimes.
Congress chose, however, not to make all activities connected
with the shipment of fighting birds criminal offenses.
Such actions do not evidence a Congressional intent to so
occupy a field of regulation as to preempt state regulation.
Congressional decisions not to criminalize certain conduct does
not mean that all such conduct is federally protected.

Failure

of Congress to include a "shoplifting" statute within its scheme
of federal offenses does not mean that Congress has decided to
protect such activity.

There is absolutely no evidence that

Congress intended to preempt states, and their political
subdivisions, in the area of animal welfare.

Rather, the purpose

seems to have been one of attempting to make enforcement of
animal cruelty statutes easier.
Congress has certainly been capable in the past of clearly
announcing that certain conduct is protected.

When such

protections have been established, however, Congress does not
generally utilize a "pregnant omission" in a criminal statute to
extend such new protection.

Instead, Congress declares a clear

5

purpose and may then legislate criminal sanctions for failure to
honor the protected classes of conduct,12
In light of the Supreme Court's warning in Guerra that " . .
.preemption is not to be lightly presumed"13 this Court is
unwilling to determine that the failure of Congress to
criminalize certain conduct is the equivalent of extending
federal protection to such conduct*

A decision of Congress not

to criminalize all interstate shipments of fighting birds does
not extend federal protection to the possession and training of
such birds for fighting purposes.
Title 7 U.S.C.

Section 2156 (d) does not preempt state or

city regulation of fighting cocks.
UNCONSTITUTIONAL DEPRIVATION OP PROPERTY
Defendant contends that he is entitled to a hearing prior to
being deprived of a significant property interest.

Defendant

argues that because the West Valley ordinance doesn't provide for
such a hearing before prohibiting the possession of birds for the
purpose of fighting, that the ordinance is therefore
unconstitutional.

Defendant argues that the ordinance violates

due process by depriving him of his property right in the
fighting cocks. West Valley City responds that proper passage of
a criminal statute is in itself a form of due process compliance.
Consideration in the legislative process builds in notice and an

12

. See the history of the various voting rights acts and other
civil rights legislation.
13

. 93 L. Ed. 2d 613 f 623 (1987).
6

opportunity to be heard on the issue that is subject to
legislative prohibition.
The City has filed a civil action to determine the
appropriate disposition of the animals pursuant to the zoning
violations alleged as well as the animal cruelty provisions.
Defendant has been, and will continue to be, afforded written
notice and an opportunity to respond, including the right to
present evidence and question witnesses in a judicial proceeding,
before a disposition is made of his interest in the subject
animals.

Certainly, such action meets the requirements of due

process.
Additionally, the Defendant has presented no law indicating
that there is a significant property interest, requiring
individual advance notice whenever specific items of property are
about to become prohibited property.

The Court is aware of no

rulings requiring such advance hearings when dealing with
proscribed birds, drugs, gambling devices, or whatever.
The West Valley city Ordinance prohibiting the raising or
training of fighting animals is not an unconstitutional
deprivation of property.
OVERBREADTH
Defendant argues that there must be a distinction between
raising and breeding animals for "legal" fights14 and those
intended for illegitimate contests.

14

Defendant argues that the

. Those destined for fights in states or countries where such
fights are legal.
7

City ordinance is overbroad because it fails to distinguish
between animals fought, or intended to be fought, in states where
such fighting is legal and those fought in states where all
animal fights are illegal,15 Defendant cites no authority for
such a proposition.

Defendant also alleges that the ordinance

interferes with people who raise such birds without intent to
fight them anywhere. Defendant believes that the ordinance will
be, or may be, enforced against such owners•
The City contends that both the actual fighting of birds as
well as the training of birds to fight to be equally cruel. The
City also argues that the quality of the conduct does not change
substantially whether the fighting is in "legal" states or
"illegal" states. The City believes that it is entitled to
prohibit activities that promote such conduct whenever they occur
within its city limits. The City also contends that the
statutory requirement of intent found in the ordinance, " . . .
for the purpose of fighting or baiting . . .,ffl6 is sufficient to
protect innocent pet owners, etc.
This Court is not convinced that because particular conduct
may be legal in another state or country, that the
instrumentalities of such conduct must necessarily not be subject

15

. Defendant's Memorandum in Support, p. 6.
Defendant's
argument seems hinged on the supposition that there is a protected
right to possess property which is illegal to use in the state in
which it is found so long as there is someplace where it may be
lawfully used. No authority has been presented to support such a
contention.
16

. West Valley City Revised Ordinance 23-5-104 (8).
8

to criminal prohibitions in Utah.

clearly, the legislative

authority of the State, and by derivation that of the City, is
not limited by the choices made by similar entities elsewhere.
Nor is it a convincing argument that innocent owners may be swept
up in the "broad brush" of the statute.

In a criminal

prosecution under this ordinance, the City must present
sufficient proof to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the
mental intent element of
baiting . . . "

H

. . .for the purpose of fighting or

Requiring proof of a mental intent is not an

unusual or suspect, requirement:, but in fact provides the
necessary protections for " innocent" ownership.
The West Valley City Ordinance is not unconstitutionally
overbroad.
VAGUENESS
Defendant asserts that the City ordinance is
unconstitutionally vague; that a person of ordinary intelligence
would not know what conduct is permissible and what conduct
prohibited.
The ordinance clearly allows raising birds for any purpose
other than the purpose of fighting or baiting.

On its face the

ordinance is not vague.
CONCLUSION
The Motion to Dismiss is denied.

The West Valley City

Ordinance is not preempted by a Title 7 U.S.C. Section 2156
prohibiting interstate activity related to fighting animals, but
specifically exempting from coverage birds shipped for fighting
9

in "legal" states*

The ordinance is neither overbroad nor vague,

An ordinance prohibiting raising or training birds for the
purpose of fighting is not an unconstitutional deprivation of
property.
The motions are denied and the matter shall be set
immediately for trial.
Dated this ^V^7 day of January, 1992.
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Addendum D
Order of the Trial Court Denying
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss,
Dated June 18, 1992

'0 „ ,
Michelle J. Ivie (#5723)
of CONDER & WANGSGARD
Attorneys for Defendant
4059 South 4000 West
West Valley City, Utah 84120
Telephone: (801) 967-5500
Fax:
(801) 967-5563
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEST VALLEY CITY,

)

D E R
Plaintiff,
Case No. 901001677 MC
Case No. 901001586 MC

vs.
DENNIS L. STREETER,
Defendant.

Based upon the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant and the
opposing

memoranda on

file

herein, and

for

other

good

cause

appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED:
That Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is herewith denied based
upon the grounds and for the reasons more particularly set forth
in the Decision

on Motion

to Dismiss

filed by

January 27, 1992.
DATED this Q_ day of June, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

WILLIAM4'A. THORNE
Circuit Court Judge

this court

on

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify
caused

that on the

/ / f ^ day of June, 1992, I

to be mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, a true and

correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to the following counsel of
record:
Keith L. Stoney
West Valley City Prosecutor
3600 South 2700 West
West Valley City, Utah 84119
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Addendum E
Order of the Trial Court Denying
Defendant's Motion to Reconsider
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss,
Dated June 18, 1992

V) !

\J
'

J

is 2

Michelle J. Ivie (#5723)
of CONDER & WANGSGARD
Attorneys for Defendant
4059 South 4000 West
West Valley City, Utah 84120
Telephone: (801) 967-5500
Fax: (801) 967-5563
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEST VALLEY CITY,
G R
Plaintiff,
Case No. 901001677 MC
Case No. 901001586 MC

vs.
DENNIS L. STREETER,
Defendant.
Based

upon

defendant's

Motion

to

Reconsider

Motion

to

Dismiss which was filed March 30, 1992, and argument proferred by
counsel for defendant at trial that same day, and for other good
cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
That Defendant's Motion to Reconsider Motion to Dismiss is
hereby denied.
DATED this fP- day of June, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

££/

WILLIAM A. THORNE
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

/o ^

day of June, 1992, I

caused to be mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to the following counsel of
record:
Keith L. Stoney
West Valley City Prosecutor
3600 South 2700 West
West Valley City, Utah 8:119
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